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Xuesong (Darren) Huang

Working Papers:

Sophisticated Banking Contracts and Fragility When Withdrawal Information is Public [Link]

Incentive Compatible Self-fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations [Link]

Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 126, March 2021, Pages 100-135

Can Redemption Fees Prevent Runs on Funds? [Paper] [Slides]

with Todd Keister

Publication:

Theoretical Economics, Volume 19 (1), January 2024, Pages 285-324

Previously circulated under the title "Information Disclosure and Financial Fragility"

Stablecoins vs. Tokenized Deposits: The Narrow Banking Debate Revisited [Paper]

with Todd Keister

Previously circulated under the title "Optimal Swing Pricing"

The Social Value of Strategic Public Information [Paper]

with Jianhao Lin and Yifan Zhang

Cores with Incomplete Information and Intransitive Preferences [Paper]

with Richard McLean

Prepared for the special issue on "The Future of Money"  at the Canadian Journal of Economics

Working in Progress:

Optimal Shadow Banking Contract with Ziyu Xing

Tokenized Deposits: Theory and Experiment

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